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Abstract
Starting from Bunge’s (1977) scientific ontology, we expose a material-
istic relational theory of space-time, that carries out the program initiated
by Leibniz, and provides a protophysical basis consistent with any rigorous
formulation of General Relativity. Space-time is constructed from general
concepts which are common to any consistent scientific theory and they
are interpreted as emergent properties of the greatest assembly of things,
namely, the world.
1 Introduction
All disciplines in modern science take the notions of space and time for granted:
physics describes elementary particles as objects with wave functions of space
and time, chemistry deals with flows of reactants, ecology studies the wandering
of plankton in the multitudinous sea and sociology describes the interactions of
neighboring cultures along their history.
But for all science space and time are primitive concepts, even for General
Relativity that associates the metric structure of space-time with the gravi-
tational field. Indeed, the question “What is space-time?” belongs to proto-
physics: the branch of ontology dealing with the basic assumptions in physics.
The ontological status of space and time has been a subject of debate for
physicists and philosophers during the last 400 years. The kernel of this debate
has been the confrontation between two antagonic positions: absolutism and
relationalism. The former, held by Newton in his famous discussion with Leibniz
(mediated by S. Clarke) [1] was stated by him in his Principia [2]
Absolute time, true and mathematical, in itself and by its own
nature, flows evenly without relation to any external thing.
Absolute space, by its own nature, without relation with any
external thing, stays always identical and motionless.
∗Facultad de Ciencias Astrono´micas y Geof´ısicas — Universidad Nacional de La Plata,
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Thus, for absolutists, space-time is the stage where the drama of nature is
enacted; i.e. the absolutist position considers space-time as much a thing as
planets or electrons are: a physical entity endowed with concrete properties. A
modern version of the absolutist position has been held by by J. Wheeler in his
geometrodynamical approach to physics [3].
The relationalist position instead asserts that space-time is not a thing but
a complex of relations among physical things. In Leibniz’s words [1]:
I have said more than once that I hold space to be something merely
relative, as time is; that I hold it to be an order of coexistents, as
time is an order of successions.
In our theatrical analogy, relationalists consider space-time as a pattern weaved
by the actors.
An important consequence of Leibniz’s ideas is that if space-time is not an
ontological primitive, then it should be possible to construct it starting from a
deeper ontological level. That is to say, the spatiotemporal relations should be
definable from more fundamental relations. There have been several attempts
to analyze the relational nature of space-time, both subjective and phenomeno-
logical (e.g. [4, 5]) and objective and realistic [6, 7].
In this paper we paper I shall present a simplification and streamlining of a
relational theory of space-time [8], based on the scientific and realistic ontology
of Bunge [7, 9].1
The choice of Bunge’s approach, which only assumes hypothesis common to
all science, is because a deductive theory of space-time cannot be built with
blocks alien to the physical science (such as cognoscent subjects or sensorial
fields) in order to be compatible with contemporary physical theories.
The theory is presented in an axiomatic way although we shall limit ourselves
in this paper to an informal presentation2.
The ontological theory of space-time is a nice example of the interaction of
science (mainly physics) and philosophy. Indeed, the hypothesis used to build
space-time will be suggested by scientific observation, leading to a consolidation
of its foundations.
2 Ontological summary
In this section we give a brief synopsis of the ontological presuppositions that
we take for granted in our theory. For greater detail see [7, 9, 11]. The basic
statements of the ontology can be formulated as follows:
1. There exist concrete objects x, named things. The set of all the things is
denoted by Θ.
1The main simplifications with respect to [8] are the introduction of Axiom 5, the use of the
notion of simultaneity to analyze clocks and of the axiom of distances to build uniformities.
Also, a general rearranging of the theory of space has shortened the overall presentation.
2On the advantages of the axiomatic method see [10] and references therein.
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2. Things can juxtapose (+˙) and superimpose (×˙) to give new things. Jux-
taposition as superimposition satisfy a Boolean algebra structure.
3. The null thing is a fiction equal to the superimposition of all things.
✸ =
∏˙
x∈Θ
x
4. Two things are separated if they do not superimpose:
x ≀ y ⇔ x×˙y = ✸
Non-separated things are called united.
5. Let T a set of things. The aggregation of T (denoted [T ]) is the supremum
of T with respect to the operation +˙.
6. The world (✷) is the aggregation of all things:
✷ = [Θ]⇔ (x ❁ ✷⇔ x ∈ Θ)
where the symbol ‘❁’ means ‘to be part of’.
7. All things are made out of basic things x ∈ Ξ ⊂ Θ by means of juxtapo-
sition or superimposition. The basic things are elementary or primitive:
(x, y ∈ Ξ) ∧ (x ❁ y)⇒ x = y
8. Things x have properties P (x). These properties can be intrinsic or rela-
tional.
9. A property p ∈ P (x) of a thing x is called hereditary if some of the
components of x posses p:
Her p =Df (∃y)[y ❁ x ∧ p ∈ P (y)]
A non hereditary property is called an emergent property.
10. The state of a thing x is a set of functions from a domain of reference M
to the set of properties P . The set of the accessible states of a thing x is
the lawful state space of x: SL(x). The state of a thing is represented by
a point in SL(x).
11. A legal statement is a restriction upon the state functions of a given class
of things. A natural law is a property represented by an empirically cor-
roborated legal statement.
12. The ontological history h(x) of a thing x is a part of SL(x) defined by
h(x) = {〈t, F (t)〉|t ∈M}
where t is an element of some auxiliary set M , and F are the functions
that represent the properties of x.
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13. There is a single universal property of material things called energy such
that the energy of an isolated thing is unchanged during its ontological
history.
14. Two things interact if each of them modifies the history of the other:
x ✶ y ⇔ h(x+˙y) 6= h(x) ∪ h(y)
15. A thing xf is a reference frame for x iff
(a) M equals the state space of xf , and
(b) h(x+˙f) = h(x) ∪ h(f)
16. A change of a thing x is an ordered pair of states:
(s1, s2) ∈ EL(x) = SL(x) × SL(x)
A change is called an event, and the space EL(x) is called the event space
of x.
17. An event e1 precedes another event e2 if they compose to give e3 ∈ EL(x):
e1 = (s1, s2) ∧ e2 = (s2, s3)⇒ e3 = (s1, s3)
The ontology sketched here (due mainly to M. Bunge [7]. See also [12]) is
realistic, because it assumes the existence of things endowed with properties,
and objective, because it is free of any reference to cognoscent subjects. We
will base the axiomatic formulation of the pregeometry of space-time on this
ontology.
3 Local Time
Let us state now the set of hypothesis that introduce the notion of local time.
First we assume the existence of an order relation between states of a given
basic thing.3
Axiom 1 (Existence of temporal order (o)) For each concrete basic thing
x ∈ Θ there exist a single ordering relation between their states ≤.
We now give a name to this ordering relation
Axiom 2 (Denotation of temporal order (s)) The set of lawful states of
x is temporally ordered by the ≤ relation.
3We present an informal classification of axioms in mathematical (m), ontological (o),
semantic (s) and physical (f). This classification is non exclusive, i.e. an axiom can belong to
more than one class.
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The above is a partial order relation: there are pairs of states that are not
ordered by ≤; e.g. given an initial condition (x0, v0) for a moving particle, there
are states (x1, v1) that are not visited by the particle.
Definition 1 (Proper history) A totally order set of states of x is called a
proper history of x.
The above axioms do not guarantee the existence of a single proper history:
they allow many of them, as in “The garden of forking paths” [13]. The following
axiom forbids such possibility
Axiom 3 (Unicity of proper history (o)) Each thing has one and only one
proper history.
Remark 1 (“Arrow of time”) The above axioms describe a kind of “arrow
of time”, although it is not related to irreversibility [14].
A proper history is also an ontological history. The parameter t ∈ M has
not to be continuous. The following axiom, a very strong version of Heraclitus’
hypothesis Panta rhei, states that every thing is changing continuously:
Axiom 4 (Continuity (o)) If the entire set of states of an ontological history
is divided in two subsets hp and hf such that every state in hp temporally precedes
any state in hf , then there exists one and only one state s0 such that s1 ≤ s0 ≤
s2, where s1 ∈ hp and s2 ∈ hf .
Remark 2 The axiom of continuity is stated in the Dedekind form [15].
Remark 3 (Continuity in quantum mechanics) Although quantum mechan-
ical “changes of state” are usually considered “instantaneous”, theory shows that
probabilities change in a continuous way. The finite width of spectral lines also
shows a continuous change in time [16].
The following theorem can be proved with the standard methods of analysis
[15]
Theorem 1 (Real representation) Given a unit change (s0, s1) there exists
a bijection T : h↔ ℜ such that
h1 = {s(τ) | τ ∈ ℜ} (1)
s0 = s(0) (2)
s1 = s(1) (3)
Definition 2 (Local time) The function T is called local time.
Remark 4 The unit change (s0, s1) is arbitary. It defines an arbitrary “unit
of local time” [14].
The above theory of local time has an important philosophical consequence:
becoming, which is usually conceived as evolution in time, is here more fun-
damental than time. The latter is constructed as an emergent property of a
changing (i.e. a becoming) thing.
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Figure 1: Scheme of a reflex action
4 Simultaneity
In order to introduce the concept of space we shall use the notion of reflexive
action (or reflex action) between two things. Intuitively, a thing x acts on
another thing y if the presence of x disturbs the history of y. Events in the real
world seem to happen in such a way that it takes some time for the action of x
to propagate up to y. This fact can be used to construct a relational theory of
space a` la Leibniz, that is, by taking space as a set of equitemporal things. It
is necessary then to define the relation of simultaneity between states of things.
Let x and y be two things with histories h(xτ ) and h(yτ ), respectively, and
let us suppose that the action of x on y starts at τ0x (See figure 1). The history
of y will be modified starting from τ0y . The proper times are still not related
but we can introduce the reflex action to define the notion of simultaneity. The
action of y on x, started at τ0y , will modify x from τ
1
x on. The relation “the
action of x on y is reflected to x” is the reflex action. Historically, G. Galilei
[17] introduced the reflection of a light pulse on a mirror to measure the speed
of light. With this relation we will define the concept of simultaneity of events
that happen on different basic things (see also [18]).
Besides we have a second important fact: observation and experiment sug-
gest that gravitation, whose source is energy, is a universal interaction, carried
by the gravitational field.
Let us now state the above hypothesis in axiom form. First, we state
Axiom 5 (Universal interaction) Any pair of basic things interact.
This extremely strong axiom states not only that there exist no completely
isolated things but that all things are interconnected.
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Remark 5 (Universal inteconection) This universal interconnection of things
should not be confused with “universal interconnection” claimed by several mysti-
cal schools. The present interconnection is possible only through physical agents,
with no mystical content.
Remark 6 (“Accelerated observers”) It is possible to model two noninter-
acting things in Minkowski space assuming they are accelerated during an infi-
nite proper time. It is easy to see that an infinite energy is necessary to keep a
constant acceleration, so the model does not represent real things, with limited
energy supply [16].
Now consider the time interval (τ1x − τ
0
x). Special Relativity suggests that it
is nonzero, since any action propagates with a finite speed. We then state
Axiom 6 (“Finite speed axiom” (o)) Given two different and separated ba-
sic things x and y, such as in Figure 1, there exists a minimum positive bound
for the interval (τ1x − τ
0
x) defined by the reflex action.
Now we can define
Definition 3 (Simultaneity) τ0y is simultaneous with τ
1/2
x =Df (1/2)(τ
1
x+τ
0
x).
The local times on x and y can be synchronized by the simultaneity rela-
tion. However, as we know from General Relativity, the simultaneity relation
is transitive only in special reference frames called synchronous [18]. We then
include the following axiom:
Axiom 7 (Synchronizability (f)) Given a set of separated basic things {xi}
there is an assignment of proper times τi such that the relation of simultaneity
is transitive.
With this axiom, the simultaneity relation is an equivalence relation. Now
we can define a first approximation to physical space:
Definition 4 (Ontic space) The equivalence class of states defined by the re-
lation of simultaneity on the set of things is the ontic space EO.
5 Universal Time
The notion of simultaneity allows the analysis of the notion of clock.
Definition 5 (Clock) A thing y ∈ Θ is a clock for the thing x if there exists
an injective function ψ : SL(y)→ SL(x), such that τ < τ
′ ⇒ ψ(τ) < ψ(τ ′).
i.e.: the proper time of the clock grows in the same way as the time of things.
Another much more important concept can be analyzed in the same way
Definition 6 (Universal time) The name Universal time applies to the proper
time of a reference thing that is also a clock.
From this definition we see that “universal time” is frame dependent in agree-
ment with the results of Special Relativity.
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6 Geometry
The notion of space we have developed up to now may be called “Philosopher’s
space” [6, 7]: there is room for things there, and separation, but there are no
distances. Our next task is to introduce metric ideas.
6.1 Pregeometric space
We shall define distances mimicking the form it is done in relativity theory:
the distance between two simultaneous events is equal to the time light takes
to travel between them multiplied by the velocity of light. Alas, we do not
have space yet, much less electromagnetism or optics, so we have to take some
roundabout. We first introduce c through an axiom:
Axiom 8 (”Light speed” (o)) c is a constant (uninterpreted) with suitable
dimensions.
Remark 7 There is no ambiguity here! The theory of units and dimensions has
been formalized [19] and the dimensions of distance will depend on the choice of
those of c. Only with the development of electromagnetism it will be possible to
interpret c as the speed of light. This definition is conventionalist, in contrast
with the realistic philosophy adopted [20].
Let us recall the definitions of (pseudo)metric and (pseudo)metric space.
Definition 7 (Metric (or distance)) A metric on a set M is a function d :
M ×M → ℜ that satisfies the conditions
1. d(x, y) = d(y, x)
2. d(x, y) + d(y, z) ≥ d(x, z)
3. x = y ⇒ d(x, y) = 0
4. d(y, x) = 0⇒ x = y
If only the first three conditions are satisfied d(x, y) is called a pseudo-metric.
A set M is a (pseudo)metric space if it admits a (pseudo)metric for every
pair of points (elements).
Now consider the reflex action relation (Figure 1). We shall first define
Definition 8 (Ontic distance) The ontic distance between the simultaneous
states at τ0y and τ
1/2
x is the function
d(x, y) =
c
2
| τ1x − τ
0
x |
We still do not know if d(x, y) is a distance (we have given it a name, that
is all). So we state
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Axiom 9 (Pseudometric (m)) The function d(x, y) is a pseudo-metric on
the ontic space EO.
With the former axioms one can prove that EO is a pseudo-metric space and
that it can be completed.
Definition 9 (Pregeometric space) Pregeometric space EP is the comple-
tion of EO.
Remark 8 The function d(x, y) is nonzero for separated things because of ax-
iom 6.
The ontic distance d(x, y) is a pseudo-metric because basic things are usu-
ally bulky and, in the case of gravitational or electromagnetic fields, they have
infinite size. Axiom 9 only guarantees that separated things have non-zero dis-
tance.
6.2 Geometric space
To build geometric space we have to introduce point-like constructs.
Definition 10 (Ontic point) Let ξ ⊂ Θ be a family of things. We say that ξ
is a complete family of united things if it satisfies:
1. Any two things of ξ are united.
2. For any thing x 6∈ ξ there is a thing y ∈ ξ separated of x.
Now we define a distance between ontic points
Definition 11 (Distance between ontic points) Let ξ, η be two ontic points.
The distance between ontic points is
dG(ξ, η) = sup
(i,j)
d(xi, yj)
where i ∈ I, j ∈ J belong to the respective index sets.
Figure 3 describes in an intuitive way how the pseudo-metric distances con-
verge to the distance between the two ontic points.
Theorem 2 (Metricity) The set of ontic points is a metric space with dis-
tance dG.
Proof: The first three distance conditions are satisfied because d is a pseudo-
metric. To show that the fourth is satisfied observe that if ξ 6= η there are
xi ≀ yj and d(xi, yj) > 0 by axiom 6. So we find
ξ 6= η ⇒ dG(ξ, η) > 0
dG(ξ, η) > 0 ⇒ ξ = η
✷
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Figure 2: Scheme of an ontic point: The family of things ξ “closes” around the
black dot representing the ontic point.
The isometric completion theorem [21, 22, 23] guarantees that the metric
space of ontic points has a completion. This justifies the definition
Definition 12 (Geometric space) The completion of ontic space is the geo-
metric space EG.
6.3 Euclidean space
Finally we need additional hypotheses implying that the structure of geometric
space is euclidean. Blumenthal [24] has given a set of axioms for Euclidean
geometry based on the notion of distance. So we shall assume
Figure 3: Construction of the distance between ontic points.
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Axiom 10 (Euclidean structure (m)) Geometric space satisfies axioms 2, 3, 5′, 6′
and 7 of reference [24].
An informal description of Blumenthal’s axioms is as follows
2 and 3: There are at least three aligned points.
5’: There are three unaligned points.
6’: There are four non coplanar points.
7: There is no fourth dimension.
The exact formulation of these axioms uses only the notion of distance.
On the other hand, the fourth axiom of Blumenthal is a theorem in this
formulation:
Theorem 3 (Completeness) Geometric space EG is complete.
which follows from the isometric completion theorem. From the above, the
following result can be derived [24]:
Theorem 4 (Euclidicity) Geometric space EG is euclidean.
Theorem 3 has a deep ontological consequence. Since ontic space EO is dense
in geometrical space EG we derive the
Theorem 5 (Aristotle-Leibniz) Ontic space is a plenum.
that is: there are concrete things everywhere.
Remark 9 This theorem is, in spite of appearances, in agreement with mod-
ern physics. Indeed, the plenum hypothesis (introduced by Aristotle and later
supported by Leibniz) is confirmed in Quantum Physics, and it leads to the pre-
diction of a plethora of vacuum phenomena (like the Casimir effect), in good
agreement with observation.
Remark 10 Let us remark that we have not assumed the existence of a plenum:
is a consequence that the ontic space is dense in EG. Neither we have assumed
that ontic space EO is euclidean, but that it is dense in an Euclidean space.
Remark 11 Remark 9 suggests that quantum mechanics is a necessary exten-
sion of classical mechanics to get a plenum. This is not true, since it is possible
to “fill” the space with fluids, such as dark matter or “dark energy”, as it is
assumed in modern cosmology [14].
Our final axiom is a semantic one, stating the interpretation of the geometric
space
Axiom 11 (Physical space (s)) EG represents physical space EPh.
This axiom closes the present theory of space-time.
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7 Conclusion
In the present theory, space-time is not a thing but a substantial property of the
largest system of things, the world ✷, emerging from the set of the relational
properties of basic things. Thus, any existential quantification over space-time
can be translated into quantification over basic things. This shows that space-
time has no ontological independence, but it is the product of the interrelation
between basic ontological building blocks. For instance, rather than stating
“space-time possesses a metric”, it should be said: “the evolution of interacting
things can be described attributing a metric tensor to their spatiotemporal
relationships”. In the present theory, however, space-time is interpreted in an
strictly materialistic and Leibnitzian sense: it is an order of successive material
coexistents.
We have mentioned above some simple philosophical consequences of this
theory: becoming is more fundamental than time, and space (space-time, in-
deed) is a plenum.
We have exposed a materialistic relational theory of space-time, that car-
ries out the program initiated by Leibniz, and provides a protophysical basis
consistent with any rigorous formulation of General Relativity. Space-time is
constructed from general concepts which are common to any consistent scien-
tific theory. The particular hypothesis used for the construction have been taken
from well corroborated scientific facts. It is shown, consequently, that there is
no need for positing the independent existence of space-time over the set of
individual things.
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